Deductibility of Stock Options
Levin/McCain Stock Option Act |
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Issue |
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Legislation introduced by Senators Levin (D-Mi.) and
McCain (R-Az.) amends two provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
relating to stock options. First, it limits an employers tax
deduction of employee wages resulting from the exercise of stock
options to the amount expensed in determining net income for financial
statement purposes. Second, for purposes of determining the R&D
tax credit, wages from stock option exercises are limited in the
same manner as the deduction. |
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Background |
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Levin introduced related legislation in 1993, the Corporate
Executives Stock Option Accountability Act. That bill
would have required SEC registrants to expense the fair value of
stock options in financial statements. The SEC was to issue regulations
defining fair value. The bill targeted lavish executive
compensation which harmed American competitiveness.
The first bill sought only to change SEC disclosure requirements
and did not change tax law.
Fueled by a failed attempt in 1993 and by articles in the Wall
Street Journal and Business Week touting soaring executive
pay, Senators Levin and McCain introduced in 1997 the Ending
Double Standards for Stock Options Act. In introducing the
second bill, Levin said the issue was no longer an "accounting
issue." According to Levin, "the accounting authorities,
the experts, have decided how this should be handled as an accounting
matter. This is now a tax loophole matter. As such the bill
limited the tax deduction for stock option compensation to the amount
expensed in the financial statements. As in 1993 he targeted only
executive pay, so the bill had an exception for broad-based option
programs. Companies which offered options to a broad base of employees
(as defined in the bill) would continue to deduct the full amount
of option exercises for both executive pay and non-executive pay.
The bill applied to all options granted after enactment.
Failing again and reenergized by Enron, Senators Levin and McCain
introduced in 2002 a modified version of the Ending Double
Standards for Stock Options Act. This bill is similar to the
1997 version, but the exception for a broad-based stock option program
has been eliminated. In introducing this bill, Levin accused Enron
of inflating earnings by keeping stock options off the company books.
He later states that most companies treat stock options the
same way Enron did and so puts an implied taint on any company
who issues options, but fails to expense them in their financial
statements. Thus, excessive executive pay is no longer the target,
but the mere issuance of options is now problematic. The new bill
continues to promote the tax loophole posture, and limits
the tax deduction for stock option compensation to the amount expensed
in the financial statements. Whereas the 1997 bill applied only
to option grants after enactment, this bill applies to all option
exercises after enactment. This denies companies a deduction for
options granted as much as 10 years ago, but for which no expense
was taken in the financial statements.
Senators Levin and McCain also have introduced legislation (S.
182) to require the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
to review the appropriate stock option accounting treatment within
one year. |
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Policy Considerations |
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The true objective of this bill remains unclear. It
claims to be closing a tax loophole. If it were a tax loophole,
who is the victim? Government revenue is likely not lowered by reason
of stock options. A deduction is permitted as in any transfer of
property for the performance of services. The recipient recognizes
the value of the property received in gross income and pays taxes
on that income, often at a higher rate than that at which the company
is able to claim a deduction. Thus, the government is likely in
a net positive position with respect to revenue after permitting
this deduction. Is Senator Levin suggesting that the recipient should
pay tax on the amount received, while the payer gets no corresponding
deduction? That would put the government in an illogical, unfair
and untenable position of double dipping on tax revenue.
To avoid an earnings charge, the initial corporate response may
well be to limit stock option programs. Executives will generally
get the compensation (including options) that the market for such
talent demands, and thus the group penalized by this bill will be
the non-executive employees who today receive options as part of
their compensation. Notably, many high tech companies, and others
as well, grant stock options to their entire employee population.
The final loss will likely be to the government in lower income
tax, Medicare tax and Social Security tax revenue.
Despite stating otherwise, Senator Levin appears to be attempting
to modify accounting practice. The FASB agreed years ago that it
would not require stock option expense to be determined under the
Black-Scholes method. Does Levin not like that conclusion, and now
is trying to force a change to accounting rules using tax law? If
this bill attempts to do so, via a backdoor denial of a legitimate
tax deduction, this true purpose of the bill should be seen, be
acknowledged and be appropriately defeated. The name of the bill
itself refers to a double standard of accounting for
options. In fact, stock options are only one of many areas in which
tax accounting and financial accounting diverge. If the elimination
of divergent accounting practices is the true object of the bill,
attacking only stock options falls far short of that goal.
Policy considerations are hard to define when the underlying agenda
is unclear. Also unclear is what this bill has to do with the unfortunate
situation emanating from the Enron downfall. However, what is clear
is the potential damage to American competitiveness and to Treasury
tax revenue if options are curtailed as a result of the passage
of this bill. |
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Recommendation
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The SVTDG opposes the Levin/McCain bill (S. 182). The
group acknowledges the current concerns in accounting practices
associated with Enron, and the need to address those concerns. However,
the SVTDG believes the Levin/McCain bill is not relevant and responsive
to this need, and will produce widespread serious and detrimental
consequences if passed. |
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